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[Nettime-bold] Asia's Cyber Censors |
Web of intrigue: Asia's Cyber Censors Louise Williams Sydney Morning Herald http://www.smh.com.au/news/0004/29/spectrum/spectrum1.html The freedom of the Internet threatens Asia's information-controlling authoritarian states. Yet, as Louise Williams reports, they also want to be at the forefront of the IT revolution sweeping the world. Information is power, or so the enduring dictators of history have understood. The authoritarian, or quasi-authoritarian regimes, of the post-colonial era in Asia have understood well the relationship between control over information and political power. In so many of Asia's capitals - from Beijing to Jakarta, from Rangoon to Hanoi, the scene was much the same. In obscure back rooms, rows of desks were lined up, their surfaces rubbed smooth by years of diligent effort, as the faceless agents of authoritarian states dutifully pored over newspapers and magazines. Carefully, the swarms of censors cut out "subversive" articles from abroad, one by one, or bent low over "offensive" captions and photographs and blacked them out by hand. They laboured over their own newspapers, too, erasing hints of rebellion and allusion to unpalatable truths tucked within the reams of propaganda which served as their societies' only sources of information. When the Soeharto regime came to power in Indonesia in the mid-1960s it shipped 10,000 of its artists, writers, unionists and activists off to a barren, isolated island called Buru where it imposed total censorship. Inmates, many of whom spent more than a decade eking out a living from the poor soil, were denied reading material and access to the tools of writing - pens, pencils, paper, typewriters - so that they would be unable to transmit their ideas even among themselves. Take a leap forward three decades to last May when the IT Security Unit of Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs quietly wandered into the files of 200,000 private computers in what was later explained as an effort to trace a damaging virus. The breach was detected by a private computer enthusiast, forcing the Government to announced that SingNet, the Internet arm of the largely state-owned telecommunications giant, SingTel, had been "wrong" to use the state security apparatus to conduct the scan without first seeking permission from individual users. Better security was promised in the future. But for the citizens of a nation accustomed to government intervention in almost every aspect of their daily lives, the scanning scare had already aptly demonstrated the potential for any one of their business or home computers to be externally monitored without their knowledge. Similarly, in 1994 an over-zealous technocrat had instructed another local Internet provider to scan 80,000 email accounts of university researchers, an unlikely group to be specifically targeted in a remote hunt for pornographic material. Within the high-rise towers of Singapore's economic success sit hundreds of thousands of computers in one of the world's most technologically advanced nations. Recent government statistics claim 42 per cent of Singaporean households are linked to the Internet, and 59 per cent have home computers, the highest participation rate in Asia. In Australia 22 per cent of homes have Internet access (47 per cent of them with home computers) and in Japan 13 per cent (42 per cent with home computers). Just completed is a nationwide broadband Internet system, called Singapore One, delivering bedazzling at-home services such as immediate access to traffic speeds on any street, thanks to global positioning systems set in all the nation's taxis, online schools, movies on demand and live news which the system "remembers" and can be rewound. Conventional narrow-band Internet connections, such as the ones most of us use, are free, various government agencies, libraries and private companies offer banks of PCs to anyone who walks in off the street and regular community education programs are held to encourage Singaporeans to embrace the IT age. For decades Singapore has fascinated political observers with its apparently contradictory mix of free-wheeling market capitalism and political controls; with information controls to match. Tough press licensing regulations, internal security provisions and the use of punitive defamation laws have fashioned a local media which often looks and sounds like a government mouthpiece, and a society built around the smooth swoosh of escalators within expansive shopping malls, not the abrasive clamour of public debate. At present, the Singapore Government blocks 100 Internet sites, but admits this is only a token, and highly ineffective, effort to control a technology which is the equivalent of information chaos. The Internet is clearly the most profound challenge yet for national governments which have used information control as one of the key pillars to maintaining political power. And now, as Singapore gears up to transform its economy into one of the world's key IT hubs, it is proving a crucial test case for other like-minded regimes in the region - China, Vietnam and Malaysia, for example - as to how governments might handle the threat from cyberspace. Has information technology - which has taken the control of communication outside national borders and thrown it into an anarchic global arena - already effectively defeated censorship? As such, will the power of the remaining governments of the region which continue to use censorship as an important political tool inevitably be eroded? Or will governments be able to limit the impact of the Internet by using "national security" laws, building higher and higher "firewalls" or turning the technology back on its users, employing it as a giant surveillance device? Already one regional government has fallen, with the help of the Internet as a mobilising tool for student demonstrations and a source of daily alternative information: the Soeharto Government of Indonesia in May 1998. Everyday in Malaysia, opposition opinions speed across the Net; sites such as freeMalaysia.com offer the juiciest rumours around on corrupt business deals with personal scandals to match. >From the United States, China is bombarded with anti-Beijing propaganda on the Net; senior politburo members feature prominently on the mailing lists just to demonstrate that the tables are being turned on a regime which has specialised in propaganda itself. Vietnam is busy trying to screen all incoming and outgoing email through a central censor. Hanoi has bought "firewalls" designed in the US for corporate use and installed them across the national network. Yet in cybercafes, groups of computer geeks have discovered they can occasionally breach them by simply hitting cancel over and over again. The hermit state of Burma has responded by banning the Internet altogether, choosing autarchy for its already impoverished citizens over the risk information technology poses to the military regime. In Communist Party-controlled Laos, the official local newspaper recently made a serious tactical error in the battle for its readers' minds. A group of Lao dissidents in the US had "borrowed" the newpaper's masthead and set up an opposition version of the daily news, posting it on the Web. The Vientiane Times disowned the copycat with outraged announcements in its own pages, merely sending more and more curious readers off to the Internet. While the power of information might be a grave threat to many of Asia's rulers, it is also economic growth. Modern economies require sophisticated communication technology and the transmission of sophisticated ideas. Clumsy attempts at information control have been recorded along the way in the most authoritarian of states. The invention of the facsimile prompted Hanoi's communist leaders to order each outgoing and incoming fax to pass physically through the hands of the censors, who sat out of sight upstairs in "fax centres" waiting for trays of letters to be sent up using pulleys. In Burma, where fax machines must be registered before use, the acting honorary consul for several European countries, Leo Nichols, is still languishing in jail, convicted of owning an unregistered machine. But the spectacular advances in information technology have rendered the censors of the past, with their quaint armoury of scissors and thick black pens, and their "secret reading rooms", obsolete. New battle lines are being drawn for control of the Internet, but the speed and mode of transmission and the sheer volume of information flashing around the globe means this is a much more difficult line to hold. In the evolution of information controls the Internet is not just the next incremental development in information technology. "It is an astonishingly large, quantum leap," said Geoff Huston, one of Australia's foremost Internet experts and a member of the Internet Architecture Board. "All the other forms of communication are simple, one-trick ponies compared with the Internet. The telephone is just for voice, TV is just for TV, but the architecture of the Internet means it is for any of these things - sound, images, video - and the network itself doesn't interfere with what is moving across it." For national governments built on information control the challenge is immense, argued Roland Rich, co-editor of the recent book Losing Control: Freedom of the Press in Asia (Asia Pacific Press) and director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions at the Australian National University. "The Internet allows people to bypass the political leadership of the country and to speak to each other directly. It is by definition anarchic, and of course it is often inaccurate, but nevertheless it gives people freedom of expression. "What we are seeing in the region is a spectrum of responses from governments that fear the Internet, from outright bans in North Korea and Burma, to a range of ways of attempting to control what information is available on the Net. "China has recently announced all sites must be registered and is using criminal laws to try to control access. Singapore has adopted a more sophisticated approach by working through the servers to enter people's individual computers." National governments have built systems of information control around national borders and using national telecommunications systems. The Internet is borderless, allowing groups from outside to beam message into individual nations. It is also an English-based technology dominated by Western ideas. Most of the huge volumes of information whizzing around the world is not political, nor of any interest to governments or most Net users. Some is of interest to censors because it exceeds the limits of moral tolerance within societies, such as pornography and violence. And some of it is of interest because it is perceived to undermine government's hold of power, either by promoting opposing ideas or by specifically seeking to mobilise opposition. "Clearly the most comfortable situation for a one-party state is to monopolise all information. But the problem with the information-based economy is that new ideas will be lateral. You can't try to corral information flow so that you only let through ideas about food production technology, for example," said Rich. "The problem with 20th-century ideas of information control is that the 21st-century economy is based on information flow. The same problems we had with central planning and control over the industrial economy in the 20th century will recur with the central control of the information economy in the 21st century. Technically, said Huston, the concept of control contradicted the very structure of the Internet. "With the telephone, the handset was just a piece of plastic and the lines in the middle were doing the work. The Internet is essentially a dumb network, it is the computers at each end that matter, the network itself just shifts data around the world without knowing what is going on. "To contol the packets of information on the Internet would be a bit like trying to find out what was inside individual cars by controlling the road system; you would have to stop each car, open it and look inside and so the efficiency and free flow of your traffic would be wrecked." In general, private corporations use "firewalls" which screen out all Net sites, except those being used for their business, partly to stop employees wasting time and partly to protect their commercial interests. Firewall systems used by national governments usually allow access to the Web with a specific list of exclusions, which requires the IT security agents to know what they are looking for. These systems are easy to subvert with tricks as simple as renaming, then "spamming" the new site to tens of thousands of users. "If there is one party on one side of a firewall and another party on the other side and they want to talk to each other and they try quite hard, they will probably subvert it," said Huston. "The best solution is not necessarily deploying technology to answer a social problem. If the wall is made higher then people will build a higher ladder. "And blocking sites attaches to them the cache of being forbidden fruit and then the game of subversion becomes even more important than the content." James Gomez knows he is being watched. But, for the 35-year-old former student activist and political scientist from the University of Singapore, the Net is a "soap box" which wasn't available to him in the past. His "politics21" Web site talks about vague democratic ideas for Singapore; pushing the boundaries of acceptable political challenges to the Government but staying within legal limits of various internal and national security regulations. His main beef these days is that Singapore has become such a cowed and complacent society over the years that censorship, as such, really isn't necessary any more because everyone self-censors as a matter of course. "I recognise that when you go on the Net you are being watched. In that sense it becomes a skewed medium because it allows your opponents to read you and it makes surveillance easier for regimes which rely on monitoring individuals," he said. "But the Net is an open space, you don't have to compete for space in a newspaper or magazine, for example, you have all the space you want." In Singapore, he said, "everyone is playing the game", the authorities and their critics alike. Government critics believe some anti-Government material is posted by the intelligence services, just to monitor who reads it. Critics, too, make sure they send their views straight to intelligence officials, just to demonstrate they know how to find them. Singapore has always been an interesting case study in Asia. Its founding prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, successfully promoted the idea of "Asian values" in politics in the 1980s and early '90s by arguing that Western democracies did not understand the structure of Asian societies nor what political systems were appropriate for them. Lee's view was essentially that developing economies could not afford the disruption that individual rights of free speech entailed. "What is the use of screaming in the slums," he was fond of saying, singling out the democratic Philippines as an example of the failure of a Western political model in Asia which had brought only dire poverty to the people. In Singapore, as in Malaysia and Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea, individual rights were suspended in the name of economic development; the right of an individual to housing, employment and food was greater than the right of an individual to criticise the regime in power. Communist Party-controlled regimes in China and Indo-China felt no such compunction to respond to their Western critics. Naturally, combined with economic success came the downside of regimes who are accountable only to themselves; in varying degrees corruption, a growing gap between the rich and poor and systems of advancement based on connections not merit have marred Asia's one-party states. Since the mid-1980s the political map of Asia has changed dramatically; with pro-democracy forces pushing out authoritarian governments in the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan, leaving Lee's neat theory of "Asian values" looking somewhat frayed or at least out of date. Singapore in 2000, said Associate Professor Bernard Tan, chairman of the National Internet Advisory Committee, "is very concerned about what is coming across the Internet". "But, at the same time we want to make sure that the Internet flowers as an industry and it is very important that content regulation is done in an enlightened way so that Internet usage grows." Singapore's initial plans for heavy-handed controls on the Net so alarmed IT companies that its national ambition of becoming an IT hub - and especially a showcase of e-commerce - seemed under threat. "We have advised the Government to use a 'light touch', they don't have to look at every page every day," Tan said of why the regulations were loosened to block only 100 sites. At Singapore's high-tech Science Park, officials are keen to explain that the Western press has exaggerated censorship on the Net. The discussion is steered towards non-political blocks on pornography and violence to protect children and gee-whiz demonstrations of the extraordinary power of Singapore One. Surveillance, as a control tool, is not discussed. George Yeo, Singapore's Trade and Industry Minister, told a recent conference in Hong Kong: "The Internet will reduce government's ability to restrain you to a set of behaviour. We just symbolically block off a few sites to make a point." Yeo also told the conference that Singapore had been advising teams of senior officials from China on Internet controls. Vietnam is also believed to have sent officials to Singapore. "I was a student leader 10 years ago, but I didn't have this opportunity to embrace political issues through this medium, so now we have to milk it for what it is worth," said Gomez. The question, though, is whether the availability of new ideas will be translated into new political challenges to the incumbent regime. In Singapore, where rapid economic growth has turned a tiny island ringed by mangrove swamps into a modern city state in three decades, complacency is high. Singapore's citizens are relatively wealthy, the state provides housing, health care, education and a range of public services; opposition figures have a lot to lose. "The idea that by simply availing yourself of the Internet you are availing yourself of subversive material is far from the truth. And even if you are accessing subversive material people have to decide whether or not they want use it," said Associate Professor Garry Rodan, from the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University. "To challenge a regime people must first be in a position to decide, that on balance, they have little to lose," said Rodan. "I am the Web master of freeMalaysia.com, a Web site which supports the process of political and social reform in Malaysia. FreeMalaysia is one of 50 such sites on the Internet," said an anonymous letter sent to the pro-Government New Straits Times newpaper in Kuala Lumpur late last year. "As a conduit of free expression, the Internet has played a pivotal role in the recent political awakening of Malaysia. One measure of the impact ... is the Government's increasing aggressiveness against the 'reformasi' [reform] phenomenon and those supporting it." Shortly before the letter was sent, freeMalaysia was labelled a "threat to national security" by the Mahathir Government and the ruling UNMO party announced it had identified 48 Web sites containing "slanderous and defamatory" material which would be investigated. FreeMalaysia promises to provide "the sort of free speech which is next to impossible to find ANYWHERE in the traditional print and broadcast media". But Malaysia has not shut the Net down. Malaysia, like Singapore, has big high-tech ambitions; in Mahathir's case a $US20 billion ($33.6 billion)"multimedia super corridor" which is supposed to end at the Petronas Twin Towers, the world's tallest buildings in downtown Kuala Lumpur. International telecommunications companies have expressed their concerns about potential Net control and the "super corridor" is lagging well behind schedule, prompting Mahathir to announce that the Net would be free. Instead, in December 1998, the Malaysian Government ordered cybercafes to register users and provide that information to police. And, unlike Singapore, where the political waters have been virtually becalmed for decades, Malaysia is in the throes of a bitter political tussle over jailed former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim. The Net, political observers say, now serves as the main source of news for much of the middle class; a hotch potch of scandal, opinion, rumour, innuendo and truth. As such, the staid broadsheets like the New Straits Times can simply be ignored. Mahathir has the upper hand but a significant, educated opposition has formed around Anwar and a new "uncensored" online newspaper Malaysiakini is already boasting 50,000 hits a day. Less than two years ago, the Soeharto regime in Indonesia was suddenly confronted with the power of the Net. For years, Indonesian oppositionists in exile in the US had been cobbling together critical stories and sending them back home to a confidential list of users. In a nation with few computers, the stories were photocopied and distributed by hand. A crude anti-Soeharto home page, with a picture of the old man defaced with blood, was set up by intelligence officials to catch those on the Net. Most ignored the warning that anyone accessing the site could be tracked by military intelligence. In truth - with the national economy in free-fall and millions of new unemployed on the streets - the Net could not be controlled by an underpaid, impoverished Ministry of Information, itself barely equipped with typewriters. Instead, the Net and mobile phones became the mobilising instruments of student demonstrations; times and places were posted as well as appeals to business people, who could see the end coming, to show what side they were on and send food and water for the long, hot protests. "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun," said Chairman Mao Zedong of the success of China's communist revolution. "Yet it is equally accurate to say that power grows out of, and is sustained by, the nib of a pen," argued Hong Kong-based China commentator, Willy Wo-Lap Lam. "Propaganda, through the heavy-handed manipulation of the media," Lam said, has been just as powerful in upholding the "mandate of heaven" of the Chinese Communist Party, as the army and the police. By late last year there were an estimated 4 million Chinese online, a tiny percentage of the population, but enough to have attracted considerable attention from the security apparatus. Many Chinese, for example, knew about the $US10 billion ($16.8 billion) smuggling scandal that was unfolding in Xiamen because they read about it on the Web, while local newspapers were banned from reporting on it. As such, even rumour becomes a potential "accountability" tool for a regime which cannot be challenged at the polls. >From Beijing have come all kinds of bellicose statements such as claims that the Net is being used to leak "state secrets" and spread "harmful information", thus justifying the establishment of a committee which is supposed to have the ability to identify any individual Net user. Just how that can be done, technically, is a bigger question. Monitoring equipment has been installed on all of China's main Web sites, all Chinese portals employ staff to weed out politically critical statements from chat rooms, Shanghai's authorities recently shut down 127 unregistered Internet cafes and individuals have been jailed for crimes such as passing on email addresses. But, while China has blocked sites put up by the US Government - Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, for example - it has failed to shut off the thousands of sites set up by Chinese dissidents in the US and other parts of the world. Consider the artful dodging of the US-based VIP Reference, a "subversive" Internet magazine regularly sent to at least 300,000 addresses in China, including the state security units. It includes political news censored by the mainland Government, information about dissidents and exposes of factional struggles within the party leadership. To escape detection the New York- and Washington-based organisers switch providers every 24 hours and recipients are asked not to forward the files inside China where they can be monitored. "We want to destroy the system of censorship over the Internet," VIP editor Li Hongkuan was quoted as saying by the Kyodo news service last year. "The Internet will affect China more deeply than other societies because China is a closed society and the Internet is an open technology," said Guo Liang, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and one of China's most prominent writers on the Net, in a recent interview. "In 1989, I was in Tiananmen Square. We failed then. The Internet won't fail." According to Willy Wo-Lap Lam: "It seems fortress CCP [Chinese Communist Party] cannot withstand the winds of change for long. Government propaganda has increasingly lost credibility ... as more urban intellectuals have access to satellite television and, in particular, dissident Web sites. "The growing diversity and irreverence of the alternative media is paving the way for the end of one-party dictatorship." "The face of Asia has been changed, even scarred, considerably by technology. Why then, the euphoria over the power of the Internet?" asked Phar Kim Beng, who teaches conflicts in modern history at Harvard University, in a recent essay. "Can the Internet upstage the cumulative impacts of steam, electricity and nuclear power combined? More pointedly, can the Net change Asian politics and society? "This appears to be a tall order. The Internet, after all, lacks the defining dimension of power called coercion. More precisely, the Internet does not possess what states otherwise have in abundance: the monopoly of violence. "Be that as it may, it would be myopic for anyone to deny the revolutionary power of the Net." Phar argued that the Net has both undermined the restrictions of geography by making physical travel unnecessary and enlarged the scope of political participation by offering cheap, fast communication to all sorts of disparate groups. The Net is only a tool. But, said Rodan, it now lies at the nexus of the desire of nations to achieve economic growth in a globalised economy and at the same time maintain political control. Rodan believes that technical controls and the use of fear of arrest or surveillance can only be partly successful unless governments can offer their citizens improving living conditions or other incentives not to rock the boat. As such, the impact of the Net will be uneven and the success of governments to control the information coming across it will be just as varied. "Regimes that don't have coherent and efficient bureaucracies and don't have effective means of co-opting the population are at greatest risk from the Internet," he said. "On its own, the Net is of no strategic use. Its power only comes alive when there is a band of active citizen groups to promote it. The power of the Net to change Asia - where three quarters of the population still survives on $US1 [$1.68] a day - should be tempered with realistic expectations," said Phar. The power of the Net, he argues, is "corrosive" and cannot be expected to undermine authoritarian regimes instantly. "That said, the Net is here to stay. It has already transformed the economies of the US and Europe. Given time, Asia will have to live with the power of the Internet." _______________________________________________ Nettime-bold mailing list Nettime-bold@nettime.org http://www.nettime.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nettime-bold